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This paper identifies two central paradoxes threatening the notion of amor fati [love of fate]: it requires us to love a potentially repellent object (as fate entails significant negativity...
Abstract: This paper identifies two central paradoxes threatening the notion of amor fati [love of fate]: it requires us to love a potentially repellent object (as fate entails significant negativity for us) and this, in the knowledge that our love will not modify our fate. Thus such love may seem impossible or pointless.
Nietzsche’s idea of amor fati involves the wish to be able to learn how to see things as beautiful. This gives the impression that amor, love, is supposed to play some role in the beautification of fate. But Nietzsche also explains amor fati in relation to his desire to be a devoted Yes-sayer.
shall call this passion the love of fate. I believe the love of fate is a permanent and unique part of our makeup as human beings, a passion which the tragic plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles did not invent but merely gratified in a powerful way, and which remains alive in each of us today.
idea of ‘amor fati’, ‘love of fate’. First introduced in 1882, amor fati marks a renewed affirmation of life for Nietzsche, a new understanding of what it means to say Yes to life. In this thesis I show how loving fate informs both Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, and
In this article I consider the relevance of Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati for interpreting central aspects of the Kyoto school philosopher Keiji Nishitani’s position in his magnum opus, Religion and Nothingness.
Amor fati — love of fate — is the defiant formula by which Nietzsche sums up his philosophical affirmation. The term, never before used in philosophy, 1 is clearly a polemical transformation of Spinoza’s amor dei intellectualis, rejecting the primacy of the intellect and positing fatum (fate) instead of Spinoza’s nature-God as the object of love.
