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1 gru 2011 · This is the first collection of essays on J. L. Austin’s philosophy published by a major Anglophone press in nearly forty years. Rejecting the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete “doyen of ordinary language philosophy”, the contributors show how Austin’s work can be brought to bear on issues that are on the top of today ...
- Austin, Dreams, and Scepticism
The crucial philosophical question is how—if at all—Austin’s...
- Truth and Merit
This chapter investigates Austin’s conception of truth,...
- Austin, Dreams, and Scepticism
11 gru 2012 · John Langshaw Austin (1911–1960) was White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He made a number of contributions in various areas of philosophy, including important work on knowledge, perception, action, freedom, truth, language, and the use of language in speech acts.
John Langshaw Austin (ur. 28 marca 1911 w Lancaster, zm. 8 lutego 1960 w Oksfordzie) – brytyjski filozof analityczny. Austin skończył studia na Uniwersytecie Oksfordzkim, gdzie został później wykładowcą i profesorem (od 1952).
John Langshaw Austin (b. 1911–d. 1960) was White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He made a number of contributions in various areas of philosophy, including important work on knowledge, perception, action, freedom, truth, language, and the use of language in speech acts. Distinctions that Austin drew in his work ...
The crucial philosophical question is how—if at all—Austin’s argumentative strategy can be made to seem unsatisfactory. One tempting thought is that it is objectionable to rely upon empirical background knowledge to explain how one can tell that one is not dreaming.
J. L. (John Langshaw) Austin dominated philosophy in Oxford from the end of the Second World War until death ended his tenure as White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1960. His work on speech acts has had a significant and lasting impact on the wider philosophical world.
This chapter investigates Austin’s conception of truth, comparing it with Frege’s. Of central importance is the relation between the conceptual and the non‐conceptual, and, in particular, how to understand the generality that characterizes the conceptual.
