Search results
1 gru 2011 · Abstract. This is the first collection of essays on J. L. Austin’s philosophy published by a major Anglophone press in nearly forty years. Rejecting the standard picture of him as an effectively obsolete “doyen of ordinary language philosophy”, the contributors show how Austin’s work can be brought to bear on issues that are on the top ...
- Austin, Dreams, and Scepticism
Abstract. Austin maintained that standard waking experience...
- Austin, Dreams, and Scepticism
11 gru 2012 · John Langshaw Austin (1911–1960) was White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He made a number of contributions in various areas of philosophy, including important work on knowledge, perception, action, freedom, truth, language, and the use of language in speech acts.
John Langshaw Austin (b. 1911–d. 1960) was White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He made a number of contributions in various areas of philosophy, including important work on knowledge, perception, action, freedom, truth, language, and the use of language in speech acts. Distinctions that Austin drew in his work ...
Speech acts, performative utterance, descriptive fallacy, linguistic phenomenology [2] John Langshaw Austin, OBE, FBA (26 March 1911 – 8 February 1960) was a British philosopher of language and leading proponent of ordinary language philosophy, best known for developing the theory of speech acts. [5] Austin pointed out that we use language to ...
John Langshaw Austin (ur. 28 marca 1911 w Lancaster, zm. 8 lutego 1960 w Oksfordzie) – brytyjski filozof analityczny. Austin skończył studia na Uniwersytecie Oksfordzkim, gdzie został później wykładowcą i profesorem (od 1952).
John Langshaw Austin (1911—1960) J. L. Austin was one of the more influential British philosophers of his time, due to his rigorous thought, extraordinary personality, and innovative philosophical method. According to John Searle, he was both passionately loved and hated by his contemporaries.
Abstract. Austin maintained that standard waking experience is phenomenologically distinguishable from dreaming. In unpublished lectures delivered at UC Berkeley (one source for Sense and Sensibilia), Austin supported this claim by citing contingent, empirical facts about dreams.
