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Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) Manson v. Brathwaite. Glover, a trained Negro undercover state police officer, purchased heroin from a seller through the open doorway of an apartment while standing for two or three minutes within two feet of the seller in a hallway illuminated by natural light.
Almost 30 years ago, in Manson v. Brathwaite,1 the Supreme Court set out a test for determining when due process requires suppression of an out-of-court identification produced by suggestive police procedures.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1977. [1] The decision touched on the exclusionary rule in state criminal proceedings. [1] The Supreme Court held that the identification procedures used against Brathwaite did not violate the Constitution of the United States. [1]
Brief Fact Summary. A suggestive identification was challenged as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“Constitution”). Synopsis of Rule of Law. The criteria laid out below are to be applied to witness identifications.
This essay will analyze the approach to eyewitness identification in Manson v. Brathwaite, discuss the criticisms associated with the test, and propose sugges-tions to combat the pitfalls of eyewitness identification evidence. I. Approach to Eyewitness Identification Before Manson v. Brathwaite In United States v.
Facts of the case. An undercover police officer bought drugs from a narcotics vendor. The officer saw the vendor up close for several minutes. The officer described the vendor to another officer who obtained a photograph of Nowell A. Brathwaite and gave it to the first officer.
A major cause of wrongful convictions is mistaken eyewitness identification. The leading Supreme Court case governing due process challenges to identification procedures, Manson v. Brathwaite, is almost 30 years old, and does not account for decades of social science research on eyewitness I.D.
